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The death and life of Tax Increment Financing (TIF): Redevelopment 
lessons in affordable housing and implementation 
 
 
Lesson Learning from TIF (Tax Increment Financing): 
 
The global financial crisis (2007-08) and subsequent recessionary effect on the 
global economy has led to national and local government retrenchment and 
increased risk of bankruptcy for city administrations. In the US, the state of 
California and its cities are now facing extreme difficulties in financing their 
public functions, such as providing affordable housing,  an issue which  is being 
compounded by the abolition of  Redevelopment Agencies (RDA) that have 
provided redevelopment funds largely through the use of Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF). The TIF model involves the hypothetication or “ring fencing” of 
taxes and is based on the assumption that property values within the designated 
TIF area will increase and generate sufficient increment tax revenue to finance 
the infrastructure improvements, often initially supported by a bond issue. In 
essence, TIF is a financing mechanism for cities to eliminate blight and 
rehabilitate areas declining in value by stimulating developments that would not 
otherwise occur (Carroll, 2008). 
 
Interestingly, at a time when many of the TIFs set up in California during the 
1950s are coming to an end, TIF and similar value capture instruments for public 
goods and services are being piloted and implemented in the UK. For the 
devolved nations of the UK (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) 
alternative financing of urban regeneration and renewal has been sought 
through instruments such as TIF, rather than traditional block grant funding that 
are now less of an option (Squires and Lord, 2012). The aim of this paper is to 
extract lessons from the experience of TIF implementation within the city and 
county of San Francisco that may be of value to TIF development in the UK.  
Further benefits from this study of TIF include contribution to wider issues of 
understanding property value growth (Man and Rosentraub, 1998; Byrne, 2006), 
its effect on jobs (Byrne, 2010), its reconfiguration of the political economy 
(Briffault, 2010), and its ability to act as a more broad focus of theoretical 
enquiry in public finance (Brueckner, 2001).  
 
To provide further geographical context for this study, several European 
countries are considering alternative value capture financing instruments such 
as TIF to provide public goods and infrastructure. In the UK, there have been 
pilots in Scotland (Scottish Futures Trust, 2011) and England (Greenhalgh et al, 
2012; Wilcox and Larkin, 2011, RICS 2011). Elsewhere in Europe, the mechanism 
is under-utilised, although discussion of its appropriation is taking place (ULI, 
2009). Similarly, the use of TIF in Australia (PWC/PCA, 2008) and New Zealand 
(Wellington City Council, 2010) is making progress, with reports suggesting that 
TIF could be a significant funding opportunity for much needed infrastructure 
improvements. Within North America, Canada has adopted TIFs in states such as 
Ontario and Alberta, with the City of Calgary Report (2005) including an attempt 
to compare the city of Calgary (Canada) with the US experience of TIF.  The 
report (ibid) acknowledges that TIF is adapted to each local context, and that it is 






























































difficult to conduct a direct comparison between cities. However, there are some 
useful universal lessons that can be learned institutionally, and some of these 
lessons are extracted in this research based on the experiences of TIF in San 
Francisco. As such, the overarching objective is to analyse, draw out and discuss, 





The first TIF was introduced in California in 1952 as a strategy to provide local 
matching funds for federal grants, although the concept of TIF had been in 
existence since the 1940’s. Currently 49 states, the District of Columbia and the 
US Virgin Islands have enacted enabling legislation for TIF.  The number of TIFs 
in operation is difficult to document exactly, as not every state requires their 
registration, however, it has been noted that the number has expanded 
exponentially over the past decade. For example, it is noted that Illinois had one 
TIF district in 1970 and now has over 900 (BPF, 2008) and at the end of August 
2011, Chicago had 163 TIF districts generating circa $500m in additional 
property tax collections each year (Chicago TIF Reform Panel, 2011).  
 
Academic literature on TIFs in California and San Francisco are limited. 
However, a study by the Public Policy Institute of California (Dardia, 1998), 
examined the size of subsides that redevelopment agencies (RDAs) received 
from property tax increment revenue between 1978 and 1982. The RDA’s 
institutional effect is measured as the difference between the growth of assessed 
value in a TIF project area and that in its matched area1. The authors show that 
very few projects’ taxable values grew fast enough to self-finance. Those projects 
that did grow fast in value began with 50% vacant land. This raises the question 
as to whether TIF appears to be more successful in development rather than 
redevelopment scenarios. Other key state led literature includes research 
studying how ‘blight’ definitions, especially in California can have an impact on 
which districts obtain TIF status (Lefcoe, 2001).  A recent report places cities 
such as San Francisco as one of a handful of US ‘superstar cities’ that can gain 
from significant property value uplift (Lefcoe, 2011).  
 
To put San Francisco TIF economic activity in state context, in the 2007-08 
accounts, at State level, California had 425 TIF districts with 756 projects and 
$515 billion of tax increment added value in assessed valuation. For San 
Francisco (county), the 2007-08 accounts note two redevelopment agencies, 10 
active TIF project areas and $10.5 billion of tax increment added value in 
assessed valuation (State of California, 2008). The City and County of San 
Francisco is now the default successor to the former RDA central resource on 
TIF. The city and county administration still holds some relevant RDA connected 
documentation including for instance, City TIF approaches and how finance 
calculations are provided (City and County of San Francisco, 2013a). The San 
Francisco Planning Department has published some key documents (as 
                                               
1
 In order to know how fast each project area would have grown in the absence of TIF, each project 
area examined is compared with another area in the city that is most similar to the project area in terms 
of blight conditions. 






























































memorandums) on the abandonment of RDAs and the probable implications of 
TIF being lost (SFPD, 2012). It is the lessons to be learnt from this loss as well as 
their use that is if significance in this paper and relevant to other city institutions 





This research is based on secondary literature review and some primary 
interviews, whilst using a case study approach (Yin, 2009). Primary interviews 
were with professional interviewees that have been heavily involved in TIF 
projects in San Francisco over the last decade. The interviews conducted on 
location in the US between September 2011 and April 2012. The study took a 
qualitative format, the rationales for which are well documented (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). Secondary literature study was from relevant academic texts, 
consultancy documents and policy literature. Interviews were with five 
professionals working in five different organizations in academia, research 
institutes, and politics (Table 1). The focus on professionals in institutions 
demonstrates the institutional approach in the case study. The institutional 
approach draws on institutional theory that has its origins in economists 
drawing on research in social psychology, in emphasizing how they can provide a 
powerful set of instruments to understand the socioeconomic transformation at 
the heart of the development process.  Instruments include new behavioural 
norms, new common mental constructs, and new capabilities for the purposes of 
coordinated development (Stein, 2008). 
 
The selection of interviewees took the form of a snowball method to enhance the 
number of potential good quality interviewees (Denzin and Lincoln, 2007) - 
suggestions for further contacts useful to the research were asked for during 
interview, and hence viewpoints are informative, and in part unavoidably biased 
towards (but not comprehensively) favouring the TIF initiative. This was 
apparent in a large proportion of TIF discussion favouring its introduction. 
Avoiding this issue in the analysis could be overcome if expanding the sample 
size in future research, such as by including individuals and institutions critical 
of a TIF approach, and by being mindful and critical of any unreasoned 
statements during this research. Interviews conducted by the author were 
recorded and/or notes made, and transcription was made following interview. 
Collation and analysis of data was enhanced using NVivo software by 
categorizing key issues and themes that emerged, with relevant quotes to 
evidence the narrative. The method of investigation was predicated upon a 
‘retroductive’ process whereby semi-structured interviews were undertaken and 
the results of this process fed into the analysis and further questioning of other 
participants in the study (Naoum, 2013; Mason, 2002). 
 
Table 1: List of Organisations Interviewed 
Profession Type Organisation 
Consultant Bay Area Economics 
Academic San Francisco State University 
Consultant Urban Land Institute 






























































Academic University of California, Berkeley 
Policy and Politics Mayor Office, City Hall, San Francisco 
 
The city of San Francisco case study was used to draw lessons for individual city 
nuances with respect to their use of TIF. San Francisco was chosen as a case 
study as the city (and county) has been successful in integrating cross-sector 
institutional support using TIF as recommended by all organisations approached 
(Table 1). Furthermore, San Francisco has managed to lever in a TIF approach to 
tackle affordable housing where there is a high density of unaffordable units. The 
research approach involved a broad discussion of the city TIF approach and 
context, characteristics of the TIF, implementation and consideration of any 
conclusive outcomes that were documented. Two key lessons from the research, 
the use of redevelopment agencies and the provision of affordable housing are 
discussed below. 
 
Institutional Less ns: The Use of Redevelopment Agencies 
 
In San Francisco, the existence of redevelopment agencies (RDAs) was pivotal to 
the successful implementation of TIFs. RDAs were in effect the institutional body 
that rasised TIF money and aided in redistributing it. The 1949 Housing Act, an 
item of federal legislation, allowed states to pass legislation as part of the wider 
federal redevelopment program, to establish RDAs that became operational in 
1956. Although the federal redevelopment program ended in 1974, California, 
and forty-four other states, and the District of Columbia, continued to authorize 
revenue by TIF (Lefcoe, 2001). Furthermore, the raising of TIFs was 
instrumental in gaining match-funding grants from the federal renewal program 
– with TIF continuing since as the primary means for local government to finance 
their own redevelopment via the redevelopment agency.  An example of such an 
RDA is the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. 
 
The termination of RDAs in California on January 2012 effectively ended state-
wide TIFs being used as a major funding mechanism for dealing with local 
‘blight’. Commentators noted the underlying reason for RDA abandonment being 
due to the ‘massive’ budget shortfall (Nyren, 2012) and in order to protect 
funding for core public services at the local level (CDOF, 2013). The 
Redevelopment Agencies (funded largely by TIF) played a significant role in San 
Francisco and their loss will be felt in the remediation of ‘blight’, although 
investment at the high end of the real estate market will no doubt continue. 
 
Another critical element brought out in the San Francisco TIF approaches is that 
TIF became entrenched in the State’s legal and codified system that set clear 
boundaries on TIF use.  The evolution of over 250 RDAs has generated detailed 
codified law on tax increment finance and redevelopment since 1956. This sense 
of historical development of TIF over half a century has meant that the 
instrument spawned an industry in itself. To get some magnitude of scale, it was 
stated by interviewee 2 that ‘there’s a whole industry around this, there’s a 
whole set of people who go from one development agency to another.  There are 
law firms, that’s all they do.  In California you’ve got 38 million people, the 
twelfth largest world economy, over 400 of these districts, over 700 project 






























































areas that have been legally designated each with multiple bonds that have been 
floated against the TIF…’ (Interviewee 2). 
 
The implementation of TIF via the RDA in San Francisco provides some 
interesting lessons to learn. For San Francisco the contestation of what defines 
‘blight’ generated a large volume of legislation and for the wider state changed 
from a physical ‘blight’ issue to more of an economic ‘blight’ issue. As one 
interviewee pointed out about San Francisco, ‘we have no deteriorating store 
front, I mean it’s relative but we’re not Baltimore, we’re not Detroit, we’re not 
Chicago’ (Interviewee 3). In determining blight, once the redevelopment area is 
approved, then the RDA do further detailed fieldwork to identify specific project 
areas. Thereafter the RDA has to determine blight, identifying a specific 
boundary for a project area, which they then take to the commission. The 
commission being the Commission on Community Investment and Infrastructure 
(CCII), that is one of two governing bodies for the Office of Community 
Investment and Infrastructure, which was created by the City and County of San 
Francisco for development approval.  
 
Additional legal implications in implementation are that RDAs could use eminent 
domain (the ability to seize private property for public and/or private 
development, with compensation payable) and avoid a vote by the people to 
raise a bond for redevelopment. The use of eminent domain in this 
implementation process avoids the use of a legal instrument known as 
‘Proposition 13’, which would normally legally bind the need for a vote by the 
people to raise another bond issue. Proposition 13 requires taxes raised by local 
governments for a designated or special purpose to be approved by two-thirds of 
the voters. Hence, the use of TIF and eminent domain by RDAs had created a 
novel way to both finance and legally support the seizure of blighted private 
spaces for new public-private developments.  
 
 
Affordable Housing Lessons 
 
The legal provision of 20% (or more) affordable housing through TIF generates 
its own significant lesson learning experiences. The Mayor’s Office of Housing 
(Mayor’s Office) that now administers the provision of affordable housing, makes 
clear that by state law, the Mayor’s Office must expend at least 20% of its tax 
increment financing for the construction or preservation of affordable housing. 
Furthermore, under this program, the Mayor’s Office must also produce 
affordable housing totaling at least 15% of all new units within the 
redevelopment project area (San Francisco City and County, 2013b). The loss of 
such revenues were of serious concern with the demise of the RDAs and TIF and 
this concern was vocalized by one interviewee; ‘if it (housing) wasn’t subsidised 
there would be none basically, at least none in the expensive parts of the State. 
And there are certainly lower cost communities where housing is affordable, you 
know, through the market but, no, I don’t think any affordable units have been 
built in the San Francisco, for example, without some kind of subsidy in decades. 
The land’s just too expensive’ (Interviewee 1).  
 






























































With the demise of the RDAs, and an interim successor agency acting as the 
governing organization, TIF funding for housing will still operate but in a more 
truncated way. The administrative body for affordable housing (The Mayor’s 
Office for Housing) has been able to secure a continuing use of TIF for affordable 
housing. The Mayor’s Office, with support of the Mayor and the Board of 
Supervisors, has adopted what have been called “SB2113” amendments to 
expiring redevelopment project areas to extend the ability of the Mayor’s Office 
to collect tax increment funds, solely for the purpose of replacing affordable 
housing lost prior to the adoption of replacement housing requirements (San 
Francisco City and County, 2013b).  This by no means secures the way for any 
future changes to replacement housing as the impact of RDA withdrawal 
unravels, and it certainly does not bode well for future additional supply of ‘non-
replacement’ housing through this 20% TIF approach. 
 
The affordable housing 20% TIF money, also has an innovative implementation, 
in that the 20% could be ported to any other TIF project where housing could be 
seen as connected to the project (e.g. labour force), even if it is not within the TIF 
district.  One interviewee states that, ‘part of it, you know, was that the 
increment that could be used for affordable housing could be from any of the 
Agency’s redevelopment project areas.  And the Agency had multiple project 
areas, generating increment from many many years ago because the 
development had occurred on those sites but nobody had ever bonded against 
that increment’ (Interviewee 5). One of the rules of TIF prevented the use of non-
housing increment outside of the redevelopment project area.  So for example, 
with the Yerba Buena Center, a mixed use development, the increment for non-
housing uses had to stay in that project area.  For housing, the city could take the 
increment anywhere in the city or county of San Francisco, because there was a 
perception that any affordable housing was a benefit to the city and to that 
project area. 
 
A further characteristic is that nothing prevented a RDA from spending more 
than 20% on affordable housing – and hence create more than 20% reserve for 
affordable housing. As a result San Francisco went out of their way to make their 
RDA an affordable housing development funder.  In comparison, Los Angeles 
never spent the 20% income flow, whereas in San Francisco they overspent by 
up to 50%.  To demonstrate the scale of reserves held, it was stated by one 
interviewee that, ‘$38 billion dollars of affordable housing money is sitting in the 
bank…they recently passed some emergency legislation that preserved that 
money for affordable housing.  So that’s the good news’ (Interviewee 4).  
 
The other 80% (following affordable housing provision) of funding is in theory 
meant to mainly pay for land assembly.  This meant that RDAs could act as land 
developers: own the land, negotiate deals, build infrastructure, influence the 
buildings built and collect ground rent.  Furthermore, depending whether legal 
restrictions allow, the other 80% can be used by RDAs for other projects such as 
to pay for community centres, public spaces, libraries and museums. In San 
Francisco, TIF could also be used for brownfield site clean-up costs. TIF therefore 
aided in generating both economic and environmentally sound development. 
 

































































There has been a long and protracted economic struggle by government 
administrations and public bodies to keep places financially buoyant. Some 
decisions at state level in the US have been to end agencies such as the 
Redevelopment Agencies (RDAs) that have been enabled from innovative 
instruments such as Tax Increment Financing (TIF). TIF is an option that may 
dissipate the difficulties had by cities, especially those that cannot generate an 
immediate fiscal revenue base for publically supported goods and services. The 
abolition of the RDAs in California may be inadvertently cutting-off the principal 
supply of funds for redevelopment, that includes much needed affordable 
housing in the State’s cities. With respect to institutional coordination for 
progressive development (Stein, 2008), the institutions in the San Francisco case 
engaged with new behavioural norms and new common mental constructs by 
operating in partnership to tackle common issues of blight and affordable 
housing – certainly the mission based language of overturning ‘blight’ and 
‘unaffordable housing’ was present by all institutional agents. The new 
capabilities will have to be equally strong if a coordinated attempt to meet the 
new challenge of affordable housing is attempted given the consolidation and 
realigning of institutions that are occurring post TIF and in the absence of RDAs. 
 
For San Francisco, lessons to b  learnt include the opportunity to deal with 
‘blight’ that would not have been dealt without some form of external financial 
stimulus. With six decades of TIF implementation, the emergence of a strong 
codified system to deal with ‘blight’ via redevelopment has spawned a TIF 
industry, and at the same time a rich and sophisticated instrument that can 
strategically deal with small scale and large scale public-private projects. For San 
Francisco it holds an example of how this strategy is not just site specific but can 
allocate funds across the city based on functional connectivity – such as the 
complex city connections of housing and employment. The presence of RDAs to 
govern such strategic insight and implementation may be lost, but they can 
remain as a beacon of lesson learning for those stakeholders taking up 
innovative financial approaches. 
 
Despite institutional differences in the UK and US, in both countries there is 
evidence that local resources and power are being bypassed at present with 
regards to using instruments such as TIF. There is a clear signal towards local 
institutional power in the UK whilst control is still being held centrally – for 
example, TIFs being selected tentatively from the centre. In the US, institutional 
control for redevelopment is largely at the local level, although economic 
development resources at the local level have been restricted – for instance by 
the state abolishing RDAs to fund the state’s fiscal gap. To date the pace of 
implementation has been slow due to a restriction by central government on the 
number of TIFs that are allowed to proceed (RICS, 2012). This cautious approach 
is regrettable at a time when the UK government faces a significant challenge to 
fund major infrastructure projects. Furthermore, with respect to housing and 
residential development, social housing in the UK is now prominently provided 
by housing associations, so TIF could form a good source of funding to support 






























































their affordable housing programmes, albeit with considered application (and a 
change to the current UK TIF rules) to ensure that unnecessary risk is not 
induced into this sector. 
 
Scotland has made early progress with three TIF pilots approved as at April 2013 
with a further three possible (Scottish Futures Trust, 2013). In Scotland, the 
Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) has advised the Scottish government on the 
appropriateness of the schemes proposed, ensuring a degree of consistency in 
the evaluation of the proposals put forward by the local authorities, covering for 
example, economic impact assessment, the business case, displacement, capture 
mechanisms and private sector engagement.  While not adopting the same role 
as the RDAs in the US, the SFT has ensured appropriate regulation of the bidding 
and evaluation process.  
 
While compulsory purchase powers are a tool open to local authorities in the UK,  
this is not seen as major strand of the TIF process and there is no direct link 
between compulsory purchase (eminent domain) and bond financing approval 
as there is in the US. At the present time this is perhaps simply a reflection on the 
immature phase of UK TIF implementation, where financing is more likely to 
come from the Public Works Loan Board than the bond market (RICS, 2012). 
Should TIF bonds gain popularity among the UK investment community then 
possibilities exist to learn from the way RDAs in the US promote and achieve 
approval for bond issuance.   
 
UK TIFs are based on the principle of capturing tax uplift on non domestic rates 
revenue to fund infrastructure projects. Providing affordable housing is not a 
pre-requisite for gaining TIF approval. That said, where housing does form part 
of the proposed overall development then the amount of affordable housing 
forms part of Section 106 agreements. (See Town and Country Planning Act, 
1990 and Growth and Infrastructure Act, 2013).   The ability of RDAs in the US to 
be flexible on the amount spent on affordable housing and where the 
development occurs, demonstrates flexibility in regeneration policy 
implementation - an approach UK local authorities may wish to reflect on. In 
doing so, there is scope for further research, particularly in replicating and 










   
































































BPF (British Property Federation) (2008), ‘Tax Increment Financing: A New Tool 
for Funding Regeneration in the UK?’, British Property Federation, London. 
 
Briffault, R. (2010), ‘The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the 
Political Economy of Local Government’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 
77, pp. 65–95. 
 
Brueckner, J. (2001), ‘Tax increment financing: A theoretical inquiry’, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 321–343.  
 
Byrne, P. (2006), ‘Determinants of Property Value Growth for Tax Increment 
Financing Districts’, Economic Development Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 317–
329. 
 
Byrne, P. (2010), ‘Does Tax Increment Financing Deliver on Its Promise of Jobs? 
The Impact of Tax Increment Financing on Municipal Employment Growth’, 
Economic Development Quarterly, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 13–22. 
 
Carroll, D. (2008). Tax Increment Financing and Property Value: An Examination 
of Business Property Using Panel Data. Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 
520-552. 
 
CCG (Core Cities Group) and BPF (British Property Federation) (2010), ‘A Rough 
Guide to Tax Increment Financing’, CCG and BPF, Manchester and London. 
 
CDOF (California Department of Finance). (2013). Redevelopment Agency 
Dissolution Site. http://www.dof.ca.gov/redevelopment/ [Accessed June 2013] 
 
City and County of San Francisco. (2013a). How Financing Works. 
http://www.sfredevelopment.org/index.aspx?page=16 [Accessed June 2013] 
 
City and County of San Francisco. (2013b). Housing Programs. 
http://www.sfredevelopment.org/index.aspx?page=75 [Accessed June 2013] 
 
City of Calgary Report (2005), ‘The U.S. Experience with Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF): A Survey of Selected U.S. Cities’, Calgary City Council, Calgary. 
 
Civic Federation. (2007). Tax Increment Financing: A Civic Federation Issue 
Brief. Civic Federation.  
 
Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research. Sage, London: 3rd 
edition 
 
Dardia, M. (1998), ‘Subsidizing redevelopment in California’, Public Policy 
Institute of California, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (2007). Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry. Sage, London: 
































































Dye, R., and Merriman, D. (2000), ‘Does tax increment financing discourage 
economic development?’ in Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 47, pp. 306–328 
 
Greenhalgh , P. Furness, H. and Hall, A. (2012). ‘Time for TIF? The prospects for 
the introduction of Tax Increment Financing in the UK from a local authority 
perspective’ in Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 367 
– 380 
 
Harvey, D. (2007). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Johnson, C. (2002). Tax Increment Financing. National Association of Realtors, 
Chicago, Il. 
 
Johnson, C. and Joyce, M. (2001). Tax Increment Financing and Economic 
Development. State University of New York Press, New York, NY. 
 
Lefcoe, G. (2001). ‘Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Redevelopment’ 
in Law, Vol. 52  991, pp. 1025–27 
 
Lefcoe, G. (2011). ‘Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses 
and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing’ in Urban Lawyer, Vol. 43, pp. 42 
 
Man, J. and Rosentraub, M. (1998), ‘Tax increment financing: municipal adoption 
and effects on property value growth’, Public Finance Review, Vol. 26, pp. 523–
547. 
 
Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative Researching. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Naoum, S.G., (2013). Dissertation Research and Writing for Construction 
Students. 3rd ed. Oxford: Routledge. 
 
Nyren, R. (2012). Abandoning Redevelopment: California’s Big Experiment. 
Urban Land Institute (ULI) Online Article 
http://urbanland.uli.org/Articles/2012/Jan/NyrenExperiment [Accessed June 
213] 
 
Persky, J., Felsenstein, D. and Wiewel, W. (1997), ‘How do we know that “but for 
the incentives” the development would not have occurred?’, in: Bingham, R. and 
Mier, R. (eds.) ‘Dilemmas of Urban Economic Development’, pp. 28–45, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
PWC - PriceWaterhouseCoopers/PCA- Property Council of Australia. (2008). Tax 
Increment Financing to fund infrastructure in Australia: Report. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers For the Property Council of Australia. 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/public_submissions/published/files/
486_propertycouncilofaustralia_SUB2.pdf [Accessed June 2013] 































































Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). (2011). The Future of Private 
Finance Initiative and Public Private Partnership, London.   
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). (2012).Tax Increment Financing 
– An Opportunity for the UK, London.   
 
Scottish Futures Trust (2011). Tax Incremental Financing in Scotland. Scottish 
Futures Trust (SFT), Edinburgh. 
 
Scottish Futures Trust (2013). Tax Incremental Financing – Review of Approach 
to Date.  Scottish Futures Trust (SFT), Edinburgh. 
 
 
SFPD – San Francisco Planning Department. (2012). Memo Re: Governor Brown’s 
Proposed Elimination of Redevelopment Agencies. SFPD. 
http://www.sfredevelopment.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=
2639 [Accessed June 2013]  
 
Squires, G. (2012). 'A Review of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Regeneration 
and Renewal' in Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 
356–366 
 
Squires, G. and Lord, A. (2012). 'The transfer of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) as 
an urban policy for spatially targeted economic development initiatives’ in Land 
Use Policy, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 817-826 
 
State of California. (2008). Community Redevelopment Agencies Annual Report. 
Office of the State Controller:  State of California. http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-
ARD-Local/LocRep/redevelop_fy0708redev_reports.pdf [Accessed June 2013] 
 
Stein, Howard. (2008). Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional 
Approach to Development. Chicago University Press. 
TIF Reform Panel. (2011). Findings and Recommendations for Reforming the Use 
of Tax Increment Financing in Chicago: Creating Greater Efficiency, 
Transparency and Accountability.  Final report presented to Mayor Emanuel, 
August 2011. 
ULI – Urban Land Institute. (2009). Value Capture Finance: Making urban 
development pay its way. Urban Land Institute. 
http://www.urbaninvestmentnetwork.com/_assets/client/images/collateral/UL
I%20Value%20Capture%20Finance%20Report%20Final.pdf [Accessed June 
2013] 
 
Weber, R., Bhattaa, S. and Merriman, D. (2003), ‘Does Tax Increment Financing 
Raise Urban Industrial Property Values?’, Urban Studies, Vol. 40, No. 10, pp. 
































































Weber, R., Bhattaa, S. and Merriman, D. (2007), ‘Spillovers from tax increment 
financing districts: implications for housing price appreciation’, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 259–281. 
 
Wellington City Council. (2010). Masterclass in Wellington: How do we Fund the 
Future Development of Our Cities? http://wellington.govt.nz/your-
council/news/2010/07/masterclass-in-wellington-how-do-we-fund-the-future-
development-of-our-cities [Accessed June 2013] 
 
Wilcox, Z. and Larkin, K. (2011). ‘A Taxing Journey: progress and challenges on 
implementing Tax Increment Financing’, Centre for Cities, London. 
 
Yin, R.K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods, SAGE, London 
 
Page 12 of 12Property Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
